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We study a variant of the conventional keeping-up-with-the-Joneses setup in which
heterogeneous-ability agents care both about consumption and leisure and receive an
utility premium if their consumption exceeds that of the Joneses’. Unlike the conven-
tional setup in which all agents are assumed to want to participate in the rat race of
staying ahead of the Joneses, our formulation explicitly permits the option to drop out.
Mean-preserving changes in the spread of the underlying ability distribution, via its
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“It must strike the modern man as strange that the Ten Commandments
end with a prohibition against coveting1, something which is neither criminal
nor punishable in any society... A man who does not want to raise his standard
of living to that enjoyed by the other fellow is considered ambitionless, and as
such reprehensible. To be sure, if coveting results only in unconstructive greed,
ostentation, or pushiness (e.g., “keeping up with the Joneses”), and therefore
entails an unseemly response to the potentially desirable stimulus of coveting, it
may be frowned upon. But when coveting impels us to greater eﬀort, so that we
may rise constructively toward the level of our more aﬄuent neighbors, we are
on the path that universally leads to approbation. Why, then, does the Bible
make a great issue of coveting, grouping it with such evil oﬀenses as murder?”
Cyrus Gordon (1963)
1 Introduction
Human beings have always had an ambivalent attitude towards the commonly-observed
practice of keeping up with the Joneses. The reason is simple. Keeping up with our
neighbors is a worthy goal insofar as it acts as a desirable stimulus, impelling us to greater
eﬀort, as noted in the passage above. On the flip side though, the very act of keeping
up exposes us to the influence of the Joneses on our lives, and this we may not like.
Predictably, this dialectic elicits one of two reactions in people; some choose to run on
the “hedonic treadmill” of staying ahead of some reference group — the “rat race” — while
others find such influence unwelcome, and opt out. In this paper, we study a preference
formulation that captures this idea — that some people, acting in their own self interest,
choose to participate in the rat race, while others choose not to. We use these preferences
to study how individual choices about participation produce consequences for aggregate
income and leisure distributions in an economy. Put another way, we ponder, what would
the income/leisure distribution look like in an economy in which agents can choose to either
join the rat race or forsake it?
Our framework is a variant on keeping up with the Joneses preferences. In such setups,
1The last of the Ten Commandments, reads as follows “You shall not covet your neighbor’s house; you
shall not covet your neighbor’s wife, or male or female slave, or ox, or donkey, or anything that belongs to
your neighbor.”
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the utility of any agent is influenced not just by her own consumption but also via exter-
nal habits – the consumption of the Joneses.2 Interpreted in a certain way, conventional
keeping-up preference formulations share the underlying presumption that everyone wel-
comes such influence from the Joneses, and wants to keep up with them if they could; the
issue of “what if they don’t?” has not received much attention.
In our setup, people care both about consumption and leisure and when it comes to
participation in the rat race, they have a choice. For example, they can choose to build a
2000 square feet house in a neighborhood with mainly 1200 square feet houses because they
receive some ‘extra’ satisfaction knowing their house is bigger than their neighbors’. In the
bargain, they sacrifice some leisure; more importantly, they expose themselves to a kind of
‘jealousy’ (Dupor and Liu, 2003) they would feel if their neighbors responded by building
3000 square feet houses. Alternatively, they can choose to build a 1000 square feet house
in that same neighborhood, give up the aforementioned utility premium, and enjoy more
leisure. Eﬀectively, the presence of the latter option oﬀers individuals a way to escape the
influence of their neighbors — from having to get caught up in the rat race.3 Depending
on one’s innate ability to convert time into income, diﬀerent people make diﬀerent choices:
some choose to work a lot and build big houses while others choose to work less and live
in smaller houses.
More formally, assume everyone cares about consumption and leisure, and preferences
over consumption are level-dependent; only when their consumption exceeds a certain
benchmark or threshold, agents get an extra utility boost from beating the benchmark,
otherwise not. The benchmark is assumed to be proportional to the cross-sectional mean
consumption in the economy; evidently, it is this endogeneity of the benchmark that makes
the subsequent analysis especially challenging.4 We embed these preferences into a model
2Models with interdependent preferences have become immensely popular in many areas of economics
and finance. Classic references in this literature include the seminal pieces by Abel (1990); Gali (1994); and
more recently, Dupor and Liu (2003).
3That the negative influence of neighbors may create ineﬃciency has been studied. Corneo and Jeanne
(1997), in a model with preferences for relative wealth, showed that status concerns induce overaccumulation
of capital but higher growth.
4We are not the first to use a version of these preferences. Creedy (1998), following up on pioneering
work by Lewis and Ulph (1988), analyze consumption and leisure choices in a model in which agents get
a utility premium after their consumption crosses an exogenous threshold. More recently, Drakopoulos
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economy inhabited by heterogenous innate-ability agents. The level-dependence in con-
sumption introduces a non-convexity in overall preferences — even though keeping-up is
restricted to consumption, its eﬀects are felt on leisure too. While the marginal bene-
fit from an additional unit of leisure is the same under the option of participation or of
dropping out, the accompanying marginal cost of lost consumption is higher under partic-
ipation. A rise in the benchmark (average consumption) raises the marginal valuation of
‘eﬀective’ consumption over leisure. A rat-race participant responds by substituting out of
leisure (into work), earning more income, and raising her own consumption. A drop-out is
spared all this.
Because of the aforediscussed nonconvexity, inequality in innate ability — what we’ll
refer to as fundamental inequality — induces inequality in other derived variables, such as
income and leisure. We show that the means of these induced distributions depend on the
entire innate-ability distribution – as such, fundamental inequality (captured, for example,
by the second moment) aﬀects the first and second moments of the income and leisure
distributions. In particular, when ability-inequality rises (modeled as a mean-preserving
increase in the spread of the innate-ability distribution), more people may participate in
the rat race, causing average labor supply and income to increase, provided the societal
consumption benchmark is suﬃciently high (made precise below). The variance of labor
supply and income may also increase.5
Our analysis informs the more general discussion, posed for example, by Banerjee and
Newman (1991), Galor (1996), and others: “Does a market economy exacerbate the level
of inequality in wealth and income, or does it merely reproduce variation in individual at-
tributes?” They go on to argue that “[u]nder the complete markets of Arrow and Debreu,
(2008) has studied an alternative version of these preferences, identifying the threshold with income needed
to satisfy some commonly-accepted notion of basic needs. Overall, this type of preference formulation has
also received some indirect empirical backing. For example, Dynan and Ravina (2007) analyze time-series
General Social Survey data for the U.S. and find that self-reported “happiness is higher the greater one’s
income is relative to one’s neighbors, with the eﬀect concentrated among those with above-average incomes.”
(italics ours)
5Kuhn and Lozano (2008) find that “between 1970 and 1990, the share of employed-for-pay U.S. men
who worked more than 48 hours in the U.S. Census reference week rose from 15.4% to 23.3%....the increase
in long hours was [...] concentrated among highly educated, high-wage, and older men, and it was largely
confined to workers paid on a salaried basis.”
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there are essentially two sources of variation in income, namely diﬀerences in preferences
and diﬀerences in endowments...”. These features are not present in our model: the model
is static, there is no risk and no market aggregation to speak of, and everyone has identical
preferences. Agents diﬀer only in their endowments of innate-ability (fundamental inequal-
ity). Yet, it is precisely the non-convexity in preferences, brought on by the choice to drop
out, that leads people with diﬀerent endowments to take disproportionately diﬀerent deci-
sions on labor supply, thereby generating disproportionate diﬀerences in income.6 In fact,
in our setup income inequality can be greater than the underlying fundamental inequality.
In an otherwise-identical model with conventional keeping-up preferences (where everyone
is assumed to be in the rat race), the first moment of the income distribution would depend
solely on the first moment of the innate-ability distribution, and income equality would
simply mirror the underlying fundamental inequality in endowments.
We go on to allow for the possibility that all agents have access to fair gambles —
consumption lotteries — that work in the following way: agents can place a bet with their
entire income and get, either a high prize (which allows them to consume more than the
benchmark) or a low prize (which forces them to drop out), and their odds depend on the
size of the bet placed. While such lotteries ‘convexify’ preferences to a large extent, they
cannot achieve strict convexity — after all, a lottery replaces the non-convex portion with a
linear segment. The implication is that fundamental inequality continues to matter for the
first and second moments of the induced distributions. As before, when ability-inequality
rises, average labor supply and income may increase and so too their variances.
In studying voluntary risk-taking behavior in the presence of lotteries, especially in
connection with endogenous income inequality, we are following a long line of research
associated with Friedman and Savage (1948), with more recent contributions by Freeman
(1996), Sadler (2000), Becker, Murphy, and Werning (2005), and Gall (2008). In Sadler
(2000), agents face two technologies, a high-return modern technology and a low-return
6The literature connecting income distribution and economic development (see Galor (1996) or Benabou
(1996)), which follows the dominant capital-market-imperfection paradigm, finds that second moment of
the income distribution aﬀects the first moment, provided the production technology of human capital or
final output is non-convex. Our approach investigates the role played by non-convexities in preferences
thereby sidestepping market frictions or indivisibilities.
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traditional technology, and entry into the former requires an up-front payment of a fixed
cost. In such a setting, some poor risk-averse agents may save up to participate in a
lottery; those who win receive a prize big-enough to pay the fixed cost, and thereby escape
poverty. In Becker, Murphy, and Werning (2005), agents care both about consumption
and status, the latter being a good sold in ‘hedonic status markets’ but in lumpy amounts
— hence the nonconvexity. In such a setting, both rich and poor agents would voluntarily
participate in lotteries; winners get both higher consumption and higher status, and losers
get lower consumption and lower status, thereby generating income inequality. Gall (2008)
introduces endowment lotteries in the framework of Galor and Zeira (1993). Agents with
intermediate incomes participate in lotteries in the presences of credit market frictions.
This changes fundamentally the dynamics of the underlying original model; in particular,
an economy with lotteries may longer display a poverty trap.
Our work is also in line with the literature investigating how initial inequality aﬀects
future growth in the presence of status concerns. In an important recent contribution,
García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2008), following up on García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky
(2006), study a Ramsey model and show that under conventional keeping-up-with-the-
Joneses preferences, simple restrictions on homogeneity of utility (in consumption and
leisure) or separability of the reference consumption level, are enough to make the initial
distribution of capital irrelevant for the aggregate equilibrium. Our focus is more on what
these preferences imply for inequality, and to what extent they amplify fundamental in-
equality. In this sense, our work is closer to Kawamoto (2009) who studies a two-class,
two-period overlapping generations model in which all agents have status concerns, and an
agent’s human capital depends on learning eﬀort in youth and the (warm-glow induced)
educational spending by parents. Young agents in richer households receive higher educa-
tional expenditure than those in poorer households; the latter spend more time on learning
though. Status-seeking aﬀects the learning incentives of young agents, and via this channel,
the long-run income distribution.7
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and
7Long and Shimomura (2004) showed that, in the Ramsey model with initial-wealth heterogeneity, if
relative wealth concerns appear in the utility function, poorer agents may catch up with wealthier agents.
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characterizes the set of agents that participate in the rat race and those that drop out.
Section 3 studies the impact of a change in the spread of the innate-ability distribution on
the induced distributions; it contains our main results. Section 4 introduces consumption
lotteries into the framework; the proof of the lottery contract is in Appendix B. Concluding
remarks are contained in Section 5. Proofs of other major results are relegated to the online
appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a simple static model in which people (indexed by i) work for a fixed wage w.
Agents diﬀer in their innate ability (equivalently, eﬀective units of time endowment), 1+hi.8
Agent i draws hi from an exogenously-specified continuous distribution with cdf F ¡hi¢ and
density f
¡
hi
¢
with support [hl, hu] where 0 ≤ hl < hu <∞. Let h¯ denote the mean value
of h, and let σ denote the standard deviation of the distribution of h.
Agents’ preferences over consumption (c) and leisure (l) are summarized by the utility
function U (c, l) as follows:
U (c, l) ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
u (c+ θ (c− κ)) + φ v (l) if c > κ
u (c) + φ v (l) if c ≤ κ
.
Here θ ≥ 0 is a scalar capturing the importance of staying ahead (see below) and κ > 0 is
the to-be-specified consumption benchmark the agent takes as given and aspires to beat.
Also, φ > 0 is a parameter capturing the relative importance of leisure.9 For now, assume
8Our specification has one major advantage over a competing framework in which eﬀective time endow-
ment is the same across all agents but wages are diﬀerent (because, say, innate human capital is diﬀerent).
In such a setting, a change in the spread of the underlying human capital distribution, via its eﬀect on the
wage distribution, would generate both an income eﬀect and a substitution eﬀect. Our framework removes
the substitution eﬀect, making the analysis more tractable.
9Our preference formulation shares many similarities with those studied in Dupor and Liu (2003). In
their paper, an increase in per-capita consumption causes a) marginal utility from own consumption to
rise relative to leisure (what they term “Keeping up with the Joneses” or KUJ) and/or b) ceteris paribus,
it lowers the agent’s own utility (“jealousy”). In our setup, those who consume more than the per-capita
consumption behave exactly as people with KUJ and jealousy preferences in Dupor and Liu (2003). The
critical diﬀerence is that Dupor and Liu (2003) do not allow agents to drop out. In our framework, as will
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the functions u and v are increasing and concave.
κ c
utility 
Figure 1a: The utility from consumption
For the present, focus attention on the “consumption portion” of these preferences. If
θ = 0, there is no utility premium to beating κ, and as such, κ is irrelevant. In this case,
the agent has a single utility function defined over the entire domain of consumption — the
standard textbook setting. However, when θ is positive, the agent has a two-piece utility
function, the pieces defined over non-overlapping portions of the consumption domain.
When her consumption exceeds κ, the agent receives utility from it as well as a bonus from
beating κ (success in the rat race). This is the satisfaction from having “made it in life”.
To carry on with the house example, only when her house is bigger than her neighbors’ does
the agent get extra utility from this knowledge; otherwise, all she gets is utility from the
house itself. Two other points deserve mention. First, the utility she gets from “housing
services” is not separable from the utility premium she gets because her house is bigger
than those of her neighbors’. Second, for fixed leisure, the marginal utility of consumption
is higher to the right of κ than to the left. Consequently, a kink (illustrated in Figure 1a),
become clear below, those who choose to drop out, do so, because they do not wish to work as hard as
those who participate.
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appears at κ.
In other respects, this formulation of preferences is fairly standard. Utility from con-
sumption and leisure is assumed to be continuous and concave in each of the two segments.
As is common in specifications of keeping-up preferences, when c > κ, higher κ hurts the
agent because it is harder to stay ahead of the neighbors. Also, for the range c > κ, our
preferences exactly match the subtractive form of the external habits formulation used in
Abel (1990).
The rest of the model is deliberately kept extremely simple. Agent i allocates her ef-
fective time endowment between work (x) and leisure (l) , and so xi + li = 1 + hi holds.
Then agent i’s budget constraint is given by ci = wxi. For future reference, note that in
this highly-simplified setting, consumption, income, and labor supply are essentially one
and the same thing.
 
c κ 
U(c) 
Figure 1b: The nonconvexity
One can use the budget constraint to solve for leisure and rewrite utility in terms of
consumption alone. Figure 1b plots U (c) for agent i, assuming a given κ : in the figure, it
is drawn as the upper envelope (thick black curve) of the utilities in the two consumption
domains, c ≤ κ, and c > κ. As is clear, the kink at κ creates a non-convexity in utility.10
Notice that the non-convexity in the consumption portion of the preferences (see Figure
1a) translates into a non-convexity in overall utility. For agent i, the theoretical possibility
10Clark and Oswald (1998) get around this nonconvexity by postulating a utility function on a costly
action a, where U (a) = αu (a− a∗)+(1− α) u (a)− c (a) where a∗ is, say, the mean action in society, c (a)
is the convex cost function, and α ∈ [0, 1].
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arises that she is made better oﬀ in an ex-ante sense were she to accept a fair gamble,
one which gives her consumption above κ with some probability and below κ with the
remaining probability. We appeal to concerns of tractability and ignore the existence of
such consumption lotteries for now; we return to this important issue in Section 4 below.
In what follows, people enjoying consumption greater than κ are informally dubbed
participants — those participating in the rat race of staying ahead of their neighbors; all
others are drop-outs, a catch-all phrase intended to replace the mouthful “non-participant
in the rat race of keeping up with the Joneses”.11 The important thing is that when c < κ,
the agent perceives no direct influence of the Joneses on her actions — she is out of the rat
race.
As is evident, some agents may not have innate ability high enough to finance a level
of consumption higher than κ, even when they enjoy no leisure. This implies that agents
with h such that
hi < hF ≡ max
³³ κ
w
− 1
´
, hl
´
holds are those who are forced (by their low ability) to stay out of the rat race. (Of course,
if hF = hl, no agent is forced out of the rat race.) All others face a choice; they can work
a lot to earn enough income so as to beat κ, or they can enjoy more leisure and drop out.
We now consider the possibility that some agents may choose to drop out of the rat
race. In other words, restrict attention to those i for whom hi > hF . When such an agent
is contemplating dropping out, her leisure and consumption are computed by solving
max
c,l
u (c) + φv (l)
subject to cid = w
¡
1 + hi − lid
¢
, taking κ as given; the subscript d refers to “dropping out”.
This yields the following first order condition:
w u0
¡
w
¡
1 + hi − li∗d
¢¢
= φv0
¡
li∗d
¢
. (1)
11A word on terminologies is in order. First, “staying out” of the rat race and “dropping out” are exactly
equivalent; the latter phrase has no pejorative implication and does not imply pursuit of an “alternative”
reclusive Thoreau-esque lifestyle. Second, the term “participant” always refers to participant in the rat
race.
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A valid interior optimum li∗d additionally satisfies w
¡
1 + hi − li∗d
¢
≡ ci∗d . The consumption
choice will satisfy ci∗d ≤ κ for all i who drop out. When that same agent contemplates
joining the rat race, her leisure and consumption are computed by solving
max
c,l
u (c+ θ (c− κ)) + φv (l)
subject to cir = w
¡
1 + hi − lir
¢
, taking κ as given; the subscript r refers to “rat race
participant”. This yields
(1 + θ)w u0
¡
(1 + θ)w
¡
1 + hi − li∗r
¢
− θκ
¢
= φ v0
¡
li∗r
¢
. (2)
A valid interior optimum li∗r here satisfies w
¡
1 + hi − li∗r
¢
≡ ci∗r . The consumption choice
will satisfy ci∗r > κ for all i who participate. It follows her consumption will be higher and
leisure lower under participation than not. It is also clear from (1) and (2) that for agent i,
while the marginal benefit from an additional unit of leisure is the same under the option
of participation or of dropping out, the accompanying marginal cost of lost consumption
is higher (because θ > 0) under participation.
Ceteris paribus, a rise in κ reduces the eﬀective consumption of a participant and raises
her marginal valuation of eﬀective consumption over leisure. This is the sense in which
participation in the rat race entails allowing oneself to be negatively influenced by the
consumption of a reference group — a complementarity also noted by Becker, Murphy, and
Werning (2005). When the marginal valuation of eﬀective consumption over leisure rises,
a participant’s eﬀective consumption falls, and she counters by substituting out of leisure
(into work), earning more income, and raising her own consumption. Needless to say, a
drop-out is spared all this.
Under the usual concavity assumptions of u and v, it is relatively straightforward to
verify that for any i, there is a unique l∗d that solves (1) and a unique l
∗
r that solves (2).
Also, l∗d and l
∗
r are each non-decreasing in h suggesting that leisure is a normal good for
both participants and drop-outs. Note that it is quite possible that a suﬃciently-rich agent
under the option of participation will have higher leisure than a suﬃciently poor agent
under the option of dropping out.
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2.2 Who participates, who doesn’t
It is useful to learn more about the identities of who chooses to participate in the rat
race and who does not. To that end, and for reasons of analytical tractability, for now we
assume a quasi-linear form:
U (c, l) ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
(c+ θ (c− κ)) + φ ln l if c > κ
c+ φ ln l if c ≤ κ
.
For this specification, the marginal utility of consumption of anyone who drops out is 1,
and for anyone who participates, is constant at 1 + θ. Let φu ≡ w (1 + hl) and
φ ≤ φu. (A.1)
It is easy to check that the first order conditions (1) and (2) imply that
lid =
φ
w
; cid = w
µ
1 + hi − φ
w
¶
(3)
lir =
φ
w (1 + θ)
; cir = w
µ
1 + hi − φ
w (1 + θ)
¶
(4)
hold. Then (A.1) implies that cid, c
i
r ≥ 0 and lid, lir ≤ 1 + hi for each i. For these candidate
solutions to be valid optima, we must verify that cid ≤ κ and cir > κ hold. From (3)-(4), it
follows that lir < l
j
d for any i, j implying that any agent who chooses to participate would
enjoy less leisure than any other agent who chooses to drop out. The principal benefit of
our choice of a quasi-linear form for utility is now apparent. Neither lid nor l
i
k depends on
hi; hence, from (3)-(4), it is clear that the leisure of anyone who participates in the rat race
is less than that of someone who drops out. Additionally, note that κ does not enter cid or
cir, a convenient feature from the standpoint of analytical tractability. This last feature is
not true in general — see Appendix A as well as Section 4 below.
An agent will choose to stay out of the rat race if the indirect utility from staying out
exceeds that from participating. Define b
¡
hi;κ
¢
to be the net diﬀerence in the utility an
agent receives under the unconstrained optimization problems (i.e., the net utility diﬀerence
between participating and dropping out, independent of whether or not cid ≤ κ and cir > κ
12
hold). Then it is easily verified that
b
¡
hi;κ
¢
=
θφ
1 + θ
+ θ
µ
w
µ
1 + hi − φ
w (1 + θ)
¶
− κ
¶
− φ ln (1 + θ) . (5)
The first term represents the additional utility from higher consumption received from
participation; the second term is the utility ‘kick’ the agent gets from the very act of
participation, and the third term is the net loss in utility incurred from needing to work
harder so as to be able to stay in. Formally, any agent i for whom b
¡
hi;κ
¢
≥ 0 holds,
chooses to participate. This corresponds to all i with hi ≥ hˆ, where hˆ is defined by
b
³
hˆ;κ
´
≡ 0.12 Straightforward algebra shows13
hi > hˆ ≡
³ κ
w
− 1
´
+
φ ln (1 + θ)
θw
≥ hF . (6)
Notice that (5) implies that b
¡
hi;κ
¢
= θw
¡
1 + hi − κ
¢
− φ ln (1 + θ) . It follows that as
φ rises, the net loss in utility incurred from needing to work harder (so as to be able to
participate) rises. This raises the cut-oﬀ, hˆ; only those who get a suﬃciently high utility
premium from participation can rationally forego the accompanying loss in utility from
having to work harder.
We now verify that cid ≤ κ for anyone who chooses to drop out and cir > κ for any agent
who chooses to participate, and hence any agent who chooses to participate would enjoy
more consumption than any other agent who chooses to drop out.
Lemma 1 If hi ≤ hˆ , agent i drops out and chooses consumption cid ≤ κ; if hi > hˆ , agent
i participates in the rat race and chooses consumption cir > κ.
12 In the proof of the following lemma, we verify that the consumptions for the agent with hi = hˆ indeed
satisfy the constraints cid ≤ κ and cir > κ.
For some high-ability agents with b

hi;κ

> 0, the solution cid = w

1 + hi − φw

may fail to satisfy
the constraint cid < κ. For these agents, the solution for dropping out would be a corner, c
i
d = κ, and
consequently, the agent enjoys even more leisure than lid =
φ
w . However, the utility received by the agent
under the constrained problem will be less than that of the unconstrained dropping-out problem used in
the construction of b

hi;κ

. Consequently, we are assured that agents with hi > hˆ will prefer to participate
rather than drop out of the rat race. A comparable argument can be made for agents with hi < hˆ for whom
the unconstrained solution cir > κ fails to hold.
13 In passing, note that when φ = 0, hˆ = hF ; i.e., if no one derives utility from leisure, then a person
participates if and only if they can. When φ is positive, people care about leisure and only then does
dropping out become a choice for some.
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The previous analysis suggests that, for a given reference point κ, the entire population
gets divided into two categories. Those with eﬀective time endowment hi < hˆ drop out
of the rat race (either by choice or by force) and they are the “drop-outs”; those with
hi ∈
h
hˆ, hh
i
stay in, and they are the participants. Formally, D ≡
n
i : hi < hˆ
o
is the
fraction of agents in the population who drop out of the rat race and K ≡
n
i : hi ≥ hˆ
o
is
the set of participants. Even if κ does not directly aﬀect cid or c
i
r, changes in κ aﬀect hˆ,
and via this channel, the size of the sets D and K. Also note, if κ is a fixed constant, hˆ
would be independent of the distribution of h.
Denote by c¯, the cross-sectional mean consumption in the economy. Then,
c¯ =
Z hˆ
hl
cid dF
¡
hi
¢
+
Z hu
hˆ
cir dF
¡
hi
¢
.
Using the expressions for cid and c
i
r derived earlier, it is straightforward to check that
c¯ = w
¡
1 + h¯
¢
−φ
Z hˆ
hl
dF ¡hi¢− φ
(1 + θ)
Z hu
hˆ
dF ¡hi¢ = w ¡1 + h¯¢−φ
³
1 + θF
³
hˆ;σ
´´
(1 + θ)
, (7)
where F
³
hˆ;σ
´
is the measure of agents (for given spread, σ) with ability less than or
equal to the cut-oﬀ hˆ, or more succinctly, the probability of an agent being in D. Since
φ(1+F(hˆ;σ)θ)
(1+θ) ≤ φ, it follows from (A.1) that c¯ > 0. It is clear from (7) that average
consumption in the economy falls when F
³
hˆ;σ
´
rises. This is intuitive because those in
the set D consume less than those in K and hence an increase in the probability mass of
the former group lowers average consumption. Also, notice that ci = wxi = w
¡
1 + hi − li
¢
∀i, implyingZ
i
ci =
Z
i
w
¡
1 + hi − li
¢
⇒ c¯ = w
£¡
1 + h¯
¢
− l¯
¤
. (8)
From (8), it is clear that average consumption and average leisure are inversely related.
A few additional words about eq.(7) are in order. Notice when φ = 0, people do not
value leisure and hence average consumption in the economy is just w
¡
1 + h¯
¢
, the income
of the agent with average h. When φ > 0, but θ = 0, people care about leisure but
not about the rat race. In that case, preferences become homothetic for the entire range
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of consumption, and hence the distribution of h does not influence the determination of
average consumption, i.e., w
¡
1 + h¯
¢
− φ < w
¡
1 + h¯
¢
holds.14 Notice when θ > 0 holds,
then F
³
hˆ;σ
´
≤ 1⇒ 1+θF(hˆ;σ)(θ+1) ≤ 1, and hence φ
µ
1+θF(hˆ;σ)
(θ+1)
¶
≤ φ obtains, implying (see
eq. (7)) that average consumption is higher when people care about keeping up. In short,
c¯φ=0 > c¯φ>0,θ>0 > c¯φ>0,θ=0 obtains.
It remains to specify the societal consumption benchmark, κ. While there is obviously
no uniquely acceptable way to choose κ, we posit without loss of much generality, that
κ = λc¯, where λ is a positive scalar. Using κ = λc¯ in (6) along with (7), we get a single
equation in the cut-oﬀ, hˆ :³
hˆ− h¯
´
+
1
w
µ
λφθ
1 + θ
¶
F
³
hˆ;σ
´
=
1
w
µ
φ ln (1 + θ)
θ
− λφ
(1 + θ)
¶
+ (λ− 1)
¡
1 + h¯
¢
. (9)
The next lemma outlines a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a unique
cut-oﬀ.
Lemma 2 Denote
λ ≡
1 + hl − φw
ln(1+θ)
θ
1 + h¯− φw
1
(1+θ)
; λ ≡
1 + hu − φw
ln(1+θ)
θ
1 + h¯− φw
.
There exists a unique hˆ ∈ [hl, hu] iﬀ
λ < λ < λ. (A.2)
Henceforth, we maintain Assumption (A.2). Notice that λ < 1 < λ holds. An implica-
tion of Lemma 2 is that the population gets split exactly into two groups, D and K.15 What
is additionally noteworthy is the dependence of hˆ on the entire distribution, F , not just h¯ —
this last feature is a consequence of the assumed dependence of κ on average consumption.
To foreshadow, a change in the exogenous innate-ability distribution will change hˆ via
the change in κ (and hence, influence the size of the sets D and K), which in turn will
14Average consumption is lower when φ > 0. The opportunity cost of leisure in terms of goods is φ
1+φ
and this is subtracted from average consumption.
15This renders impossible a situation, for example, in which an agent with a very high h chooses to drop
out and enjoy leisure; the loss in utility from the resultant decline in her consumption would simply hurt
her too much.
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aﬀect the induced distributions of income/consumption and leisure. Indeed, the eﬀect will
pervade beyond the first moments of these induced distributions. As will be evident, a
model in which agents have no option to drop out will not generate such outcomes.
2.3 Moments of the induced distributions
For future use, define average leisure
¡
l¯
¢
in the economy as follows:
l¯ =
Z hˆ
hl
lid dF
¡
hi
¢
+
Z hu
hˆ
lir dF
¡
hi
¢
. (10)
This is the weighted average of the leisure enjoyed by those who drop out and those who stay
in; in our case, these weights are endogenous since hˆ is endogenous. Using the expressions
for lid and l
i
r derived earlier, it follows that
l¯ =
φ
(1 + θ)w
h
1 + θF
³
hˆ;σ
´i
. (11)
Similarly, the variance of leisure may be calculated from
V (l) =
Z hˆ
hl
µ
φ
w
− l¯
¶2
dF ¡hi¢+ Z hu
hˆ
µ
φ
w (1 + θ)
− l¯
¶2
dF ¡hi¢ ,
which simplifies to
V (l) =
µ
φ
w
¶2µ θ
(1 + θ)
¶2 ³
1− F
³
hˆ;σ
´´
F
³
hˆ;σ
´
. (12)
Finally, denote by y¯, the cross-sectional mean income in the economy. Then, since
income and consumption are identical, y¯ = c¯. The variance of income (the same as the
variance of consumption) is given by
V (y) =
Z hˆ
hl
Ã
w
µ
1 + hi − φ
w
¶
− w
¡
1 + h¯
¢
+ φ
Z hˆ
hl
dF ¡hi¢+ φ
(1 + θ)
Z hu
hˆ
dF ¡hi¢!2 dF ¡hi¢
+
Z hu
hˆ
Ã
w
µ
1 + hi − φ
(1 + θ)w
¶
− w
¡
1 + h¯
¢
+ φ
Z hˆ
hl
dF ¡hi¢+ φ
(1 + θ)
Z hu
hˆ
dF ¡hi¢!2 dF ¡hi¢
which, after routine simplification yields,
V (y) = w2σ2 +
µ
θ
(1 + θ)
¶2
φ2F
³
hˆ;σ
´³
1−F
³
hˆ;σ
´´
. (13)
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Among the first things to notice is that the mean and variance of income and leisure
depend on the entire distribution of h — as noted earlier, this is a consequence of the
dependence of κ on average consumption. Next, notice from (13) that variance of income
is clearly more-than-proportionately higher than the variance of the underlying innate-
ability distribution, σ2. And this is true when θ > 0, i.e., when people care about staying
ahead of the Joneses. Put another way, the option to drop out of the rat race exacerbates
fundamental inequality because it increases income inequality disproportionately — the
pass-through (if you will) from fundamental to income inequality is more than one-to-
one.16 A model with assumed/forced keeping-up cannot generate this. In such a setup,
average leisure (assuming the quasi-linear preference structure of Section 2.2) would not
even depend on the first moment of the innate-ability distribution, and the second moment
of the income distribution (see (13)) would exactly mirror the same for the innate-ability
distribution — merely ‘reproducing variation in individual attributes’.
3 Changes in the innate-ability distribution
We are now in a position to ask the question, how do changes in the exogenous innate-
ability distribution aﬀect the induced distributions of income and leisure in the economy?
Our focus is restricted to a mean-preserving increase in the spread (MPIS) of the ability
distribution. Such an increase redistributes mass away from the center and towards the
tails. For a fixed cut-oﬀ, the mass redistribution would have a first-order eﬀect on the
number of drop-outs. In our setup, since the cutoﬀ itself depends on average consumption,
there would be an additional (second-order) eﬀect; that is, the first-order change in average
consumption would change the cutoﬀ and hence the mass of drop-outs, and ultimately the
16This result is special to the preference formulation used here because it produces leisure for the two
groups that does not depend on their innate abilities. For other utility specifications, leisure tends to
smooth some of the innate-ability diﬀerences, and hence, the pass-through from fundamental to income
inequality may be less than one to one. For this reason, the interesting comparison is between the income
inequality in an economy in which people care about keeping up (θ > 0) versus one in which they do not.
In this context, it deserves mention that, for general utility specifications, the inequality in income is higher
when people care about keeping up. This occurs because i) the leisure decision of agents that drop out is
not aﬀected by the benchmark, and ii) those that participate in the rat race must supply more labor if they
care about keeping-up than if they don’t.
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means and variances of the induced distributions of income and leisure.
3.1 Position of the cut-oﬀ ability relative to the mean
It is well known that if a new unimodal distribution, F (h, σ2) , is obtained from an old one,
F (h, σ1) , via a mean-preserving increase in spread from σ1 to σ2, it exhibits the single
crossing property. That is, there exists an h∗ such that F (h, σ2) R F (h, σ1) whenever h Q
h∗. Also, when the mean is preserved, and F (.) is a symmetric and unimodal distribution,
the single crossing takes place at the mean, i.e., h∗ = h¯.17 See Figures 2a and 2b for
an illustration. Intuitively, for a symmetric and unimodal distribution, a mean-preserving
increase in spread redistributes the mass evenly away from the mean towards the tails,
implying draws near the mean under the new distribution are less likely and draws near
the tails are correspondingly more likely.
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The analytical results below are derived under the assumption that F (.) is a symmetric
and unimodal distribution.18 In that case, the position of the cut-oﬀ relative to the mean
will be critical in what follows.19 This is because for a symmetric distribution, when
σ increases in a mean preserving manner, F
³
hˆ;σ
´
rises (falls) for all hˆ below (above)
17Recall, that for a density function f symmetric about its mean h¯, the skewness given by μ3 ≡ E

hi − h¯
3
is zero, and F h¯ = 1/2. If μ3 > 0, the density is often called skewed to the right, or having long tails to
the right.
18The robustness of our results extends to skewed distributions; see Section 4 below.
19More generally, what is crucial is the position of the cut-oﬀ hˆ relative to the single crossing point h∗
(which, for asymmetric distributions, may not coincide with the mean).
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the single-crossing point (which, in this case, is the mean h¯). In short, for a symmetric,
unimodal distribution, F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
R 0 as hˆ S h¯.
Lemma 3 Let F (;σ) be a symmetric and unimodal distribution. Define
λ† ≡
1 + h¯− φw
ln(1+θ)
θ
1 + h¯− φw
1
(1+θ)
¡
1 + θ2
¢ .
Then, a) hˆ T h¯ iﬀ λ T λ†, and b) λ < λ† < λ.
This means for any λ in the range
¡
λ†, λ
¢
, hˆ > h¯⇔ F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
< 0 will obtain; similarly,
for any λ in the range
¡
λ, λ†
¢
, hˆ < h¯⇔ F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
> 0 will obtain.20 We are now ready to
state a very important result.
Proposition 1 a) The sign of dhˆdσ is opposite that of F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
. b) Suppose λ > λ†. Then,
for a symmetric and unimodal distribution, dhˆdσ ≥ 0 holds, implying a mean-preserving
increase in the spread raises the cut-oﬀ, hˆ.
To summarize: from Lemma 3, we know that for a symmetric and unimodal distribution
of innate ability, the cut-oﬀ, hˆ, will exceed the mean, h¯, for high-enough λ. Proposition
1 takes it further by claiming that for symmetric distributions, and for high-enough λ, a
mean-preserving increase in the spread raises the cut-oﬀ hˆ.
As discussed above, for suﬃciently high λ, hˆ > h¯ holds and this implies F
³
hˆ;σ
´
falls
when σ increases. In other words, a mean-preserving increase in spread reduces the mass
on those not in the rat race. Since the consumption of the latter is lower than that of those
who are, average consumption rises, and hence the cut-oﬀ rises.
3.2 Eﬀect on the induced distributions
We start by exploring the eﬀect on average leisure in the economy. In a sense, this is our
flagship result; hence we devote a fair amount of words to explain it and provide intuition.
Many of the results that follow, work oﬀ similar intuition.
20By inspection, λ† > 1. This is an artifact of our simplifying assumptions of symmetric distributions
and quasi-linear utility. We have verified that for a more general CRRA form utility, λ† ≤ 1 is possible. In
any case, it is not unreasonable to imagine that people who are in the rat race aspire to reach consumption
levels that are “above average”.
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Proposition 2 a) ∂l¯∂σ has the same sign as F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
. b) Suppose λ > λ†. Then, for a
symmetric and unimodal distribution, ∂l¯∂σ ≤ 0.
In other words, for suﬃciently high λ, a mean preserving increase in the spread of the
innate-ability distribution reduces average leisure. Loosely speaking, Proposition 2 says
that when people desire to stay ahead of a benchmark that exceeds average consumption,
an increase in the underlying inequality pushes them to work harder on average.
h 
A
B C 
E F 
D 
G 
H 
hˆ  
 f(h) 
m 
h  
Figure 3: A mean-preserving increase in spread
To get a sense of the intuition for Proposition 2, focus attention on Figure 3. In this
figure, the heavier purple curve represents a mean-preserving increase in spread of the
original distribution (shown as the thin black line). For ease of presentation, we start
by considering a fixed hˆ (the bold red vertical line drawn here to the left of the point m;
arguments similar to the ones presented below hold when hˆ is to the right of m). Under the
original distribution, the mass of people dropping out is given by the area B+C +E+F ;
under the new distribution, the mass becomes A + E + F. Since both distributions are
symmetric, B+E = A+E = 0.5 implying that the mass of agents below h¯ — all drop-outs
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— is the same. Above the mean, the mass of drop-outs in the original distribution is C +F
while it is F under the new distribution; this implies that the total mass of drop-outs is
now reduced by the area C.21 Since those that participate in the rat race consume less
leisure than those who drop out, the net eﬀect is that average leisure goes down.
More generally though, we know from Lemma 3 that a mean-preserving increase in the
spread raises the cutoﬀ hˆ when hˆ lies above h¯ (i.e., it moves the red line to the right).
Why? Above, we established that the net eﬀect of an increase in spread is that average
leisure goes down for a given hˆ ; this means average consumption rises and this causes
the cutoﬀ hˆ to rise as well. The increase in hˆ further serves to increase average leisure;
evidently, this last eﬀect is of second-order magnitude.
Next, we study the eﬀect of a MPIS of the innate-ability distribution on the second
moment of the leisure distribution.
Proposition 3 Suppose λ > λ†. Then, for a symmetric and unimodal distribution,
∂V (l)
∂σ
> 0.
In other words, for suﬃciently high λ, a mean-preserving increase in the spread of the
innate-ability distribution raises the variance of the leisure distribution.
How does a change in the innate-ability distribution aﬀect the first and second moments
of the income distribution?
Proposition 4 a) ∂y¯∂σ has the opposite sign of F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
. b) Suppose λ > λ†. Then, for a
symmetric and unimodal distribution, ∂y¯∂σ > 0 and
∂V (y)
∂σ > 0.
In other words, for suﬃciently high λ, a mean-preserving increase in the spread of the
innate-ability distribution raises the average income in the economy. It also increases the
variance of income.
21Under the old distribution, the mass of participants is D +H and under the new, it is H +G. Since
C + D + F + H = F + H + G = 0.5, it follows that C + D = G, i.e., the net increase in the mass of
participants is C = G−D.
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4 Consumption lotteries
The analysis thus far has ignored the possibility that agents may have access to consump-
tion lotteries — a central theme in Sadler (2000) and Becker, Murphy, and Werning (2005).
We start with some general discussion regarding consumption lotteries and their potential
to make some people, with our kind of keeping-up preferences, better oﬀ.
cl ch κ c 
A 
B
Figure 4: Consumption lotteries
To that end, focus attention on Figure 4 which plots the utility from consumption. A
person with income yi faces a kinked utility function (the kink is at κ) in the consumption
space. The kink introduces a non-concave segment in the utility function. Suppose a
lottery was available that oﬀered a top prize of ch > κ and a low prize of cl < κ; also
suppose that if cl (ch) was put into the lottery, the chance of winning the top prize was
exactly 0 (1). In an ex-ante sense, an agent who can invest the income-equivalent of an
amount in the range (cl, ch) would be better oﬀ participating in the lottery. People with
income-equivalents in the range (cl, κ) would benefit from having a shot at joining the rat
race, while those with income-equivalents in the range (κ, ch) would benefit from being
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able to reach ch.
We now derive the terms of such lotteries.22 Consider a setting in which such lotteries
are freely accessible by all agents, though, in equilibrium, not all will choose to partici-
pate. We assume the lotteries are fair in the sense that the expected payout to a lottery
participant equals the amount invested in it.
Consider agent i who invests her income yi in such a lottery.23 The lottery pays ch
if agent i wins the lottery; otherwise it pays cl < yi. Let αi be the probability of agent i
winning the lottery. Then, since the lottery is fair to agent i,
αich + (1− αi) cl = yi ⇒ αi =
yi − cl
ch − cl
.
Since αi ∈ [0, 1], it follows that agent i participates in such a lottery if ch ≥ yi ≥ cl. In other
words, the subset of agents that potentially participate in such a lottery are those with
income-equivalents yi ∈ [cl, ch] . In passing, notice that the odds of winning increase with
the amount invested. Those whose incomes are below cl do not participate because they
prefer the sure thing (their income) to any fair lottery oﬀered to them. They are drop-outs.
Similarly, people with incomes above ch do not participate — they are rat race participants.
The remaining participate in the lottery aspiring to stay ahead of the Joneses; ex post,
only a fraction α¯ succeed where α¯ is the mean α of all lottery players.
How are cl and ch selected? We posit a perfectly competitive lottery industry where
individual lottery firms are Nash competitors. In other words, cl and ch are chosen by
maximizing the expected utility of any lottery participant. The lottery firm is aware that
its choices of cl and ch would aﬀect the labor supply decision of the participants.
Proposition 5 The lottery prizes, cl and ch, satisfy
u0 (cl) = (1 + θ)u0 ((1 + θ) ch − θκ) . (14)
An agent with income yi ∈ [cl, ch] faces the odds
αi =
yi − cl
ch − cl
22See Hartley and Farrell (2002) and Sadler (2000) for detailed discussion.
23Of course, yi is a function of the agent’s choice of leisure, i.e., yi (li) = w

1 + hi − li

; for now,
notationally we suppress the dependence of yi on li.
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of winning the top prize, ch.
Notice that the prizes, ch and cl, are independent of i. In passing, notice that (14)
represents the line segment AB in Figure 4, a tangency condition if you will, with the
tangent touching points A and B.
In our framework, as is readily apparent, an agent can influence her odds of winning
the lottery, α, by working harder. The question then arises, conditional on an agent
participating in the lottery, what is the optimal amount of leisure she enjoys? If she
participates, her expected utility as a function of her choice of leisure is given by
Ui (l) = αi (l)u (ch) + (1− αi (l))u (cl) + φv (l)
where αi (l) =
yi(l)−cl
ch−cl . Then, the first order condition for an interior solution is given by
α0i (l) [u (ch)− u (cl)] + φv0 (l) = 0. (15)
Since yi (l) = w
¡
1 + hi − l
¢
, it follows that α0i (l) is independent of l and i. This implies
the solution of (15) is independent of i. In short, all lottery participants enjoy the same
leisure; those with high h get higher incomes (and hence, better odds) than those with
lower h.
From here on, we focus attention on a special functional form for preferences:
U (c, l) ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
ln (c+ θ (c− κ)) + φ ln l if c > κ
ln c+ φ ln l if c ≤ κ
. (16)
For the preferences described by (16), it is easy to check that (14) reduces to
ch − cl =
θ
1 + θ
κ. (17)
Using (27)-(??) in the appendix, and (17), it can be shown that
cl =
θκ
1 + θ
1
ln (1 + θ)
; ch =
θ
1 + θ
κ
∙
1 +
1
ln (1 + θ)
¸
. (18)
Using (15), it also follows that the leisure of all lottery participants is given by
llot =
φ θ1+θ
κ
w
ln (1 + θ)
.
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Then, using (19)-(20) in Appendix A, it can be shown that
drop-outs lid =
φ
(φ+1) (1 + hi)
¡
1 + hi
¢
<
³
θ
1+θ
κ
w
´
1+φ
ln(1+θ) ≡
¡
1 + h†
¢
lottery players llot = θ1+θ
φ
ln(1+θ)
κ
w
¡
1 + h†
¢
<
¡
1 + hi
¢
<
³
θ
1+θ
κ
w
´³
1 + (1+φ)ln(1+θ)
´
≡ (1 + h∗)
participants lir = lid − θ(θ+1)
φ
(φ+1)
κ
w
¡
1 + hi
¢
> (1 + h∗)
In other words, there emerges an endogenous separation of the population into three groups.
Those with ability less than h† drop out and do not participate in the lottery; and those
with ability greater than h∗ are in the rat race even though they do not participate. Those
aspiring to join the rat race are lottery participants, those with ability
¡
h†, h∗
¢
.
The log-log formulation is a departure from the preferences used earlier in the paper.
It is discussed in greater detail in Appendix A. The reason for the change is simple: for
the preferences described in Section 2.2, everyone participates in the lottery, and hence,
no one can make the ex-ante choice to participate in the rat race or drop out; their ex post
status is determined entirely by the lottery outcome. The preferences outlined in (16) are
less limiting. Of course, some of the lottery participants would be labeled drop-outs in a
world sans lotteries.
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Figure 5: Leisure in the presence of lotteries
We focus on explaining how our flagship result regarding average leisure is aﬀected with
the introduction of lotteries. Consider Figure 5 which is drawn under the assumption of a
fixed κ. (Note: h† and h∗ are defined in the box above, and hˆ, the ability corresponding
to the agent who is indiﬀerent between dropping out of the rat race and participating in a
world with no lotteries, is defined in (21) below). In the absence of lotteries, agents with
ability h < hˆ are drop-outs and their leisure is described by the line segment, OB [a line
with slope φ/(1 + φ)]; similarly, those with ability h > hˆ are participants and their leisure
is described by the line segment CE.
When lotteries are available, the lottery players’ leisure is described by the line segment
AD. Agents with ability in the range
¡
h†, h∗
¢
, the erstwhile drop-outs, now participate in
the lottery; their leisure is described by AF and no longer by AB. Similarly, agents with
ability in the range
³
hˆ, h∗
´
, the erstwhile participants, now play the lottery; their leisure
is described by the segment FD and no longer by CD. It follows that if the distribution of
h puts suﬃcient weight on agents with low h (those who enjoy reduced leisure), the overall
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eﬀect of introducing lotteries is a likely reduction in average leisure.
It is not possible to make much analytical progress from here on. Below, we present
an example illustrating the eﬀects of MPIS in h on the first and second moments of the
induced distributions. The expressions for these moments are derived in Appendix A. It
is assumed that h follows a skewed Beta distribution; the figures below support our claim
that the theoretical results derived earlier for symmetric distributions generalize to skewed
distributions.
Example 1 Suppose w = 1, φ = 1, θ = 0.5, λ = 1.5, and let hi be drawn from a Beta
distribution with fixed mean 0.4 and variance σ. Figure 6a and 6b plots average leisure and
income against σ2 ∈ [0.05, 0.5]. Figure 6c and 6d plot the variance of leisure and income
against fundamental inequality — σ2 ∈ [0.05, 0.5] . The black (red) line represents variables
from the model economy in which lotteries are absent (present).
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Figure 6a: Average leisure against σ2
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Figure 6b: Average income against σ2
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Figure 6c: Variance of leisure against σ2
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Figure 6d: Variance of income against σ2
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Figure 6e: The mass of drop-outs (ex ante)
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Figure 6f: Mass of rat race and lottery
A few words about Figure 6 are in order. First, for the parametric specification in
Example 1, average leisure falls while average income rises with a mean-preserving increase
in the spread. Second, the variance of both income and leisure rise with a MPIS of h. These
pictures indicate that the main thrust of our previously-derived analytical results (from the
model sans lotteries) continue to hold. It deserves mention that income inequality in the
presence of lotteries (see Fig 6d) is initially lower (for low σ2) but as fundamental inequality
rises, it catches up and then exceeds income inequality from the model sans lotteries. The
same pattern emerges in leisure inequality.
At first glance, it might seem counterintuitive that income inequality (for low σ2) may
be lower in the model with lotteries. After all, lotteries, by redistributing mass from the
entire range of incomes of the lottery players to only the endpoints of that range, ought
to raise the overall spread in income. Of course, there is a countervailing eﬀect, as is clear
from Figures 6(e)-6(f) — the mass of agents in each category (drop-outs, lottery players,
and rat race participants) is vastly diﬀerent depending on whether lotteries are present or
not. For low values of σ2 — Figure 6e — the mass of drop-outs in the two models, with
and without lotteries, is virtually identical. But as Figure 6f illustrates, for low values of
σ2, the mass of rat race participants in the model without lotteries (black line) and the
mass of lottery players in the model with lotteries (green line) is similar. Loosely speaking,
introducing lotteries converts the erstwhile rat race participants into lottery players; ceteris
paribus, this raises the income inequality.
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5 Concluding remarks
From biblical times, human beings have struggled with an innate desire to covet their
neighbors’ possessions. For many, this translates into a seemingly endless pursuit of keeping
up to the consumption standards set by their neighbors. Others simply drop out of this
rat race. In this paper, we take the stance that people who successfully keep up with
their neighbors receive an extra boost in utility relative to those who drop out. We embed
this preference formulation in a simple framework in which heterogenous-ability agents get
utility not just from consumption but also from the very act of keeping up with a benchmark
proportional to the average level of consumption. We ask, what do such preferences imply
for the distribution of income (and leisure) in an economy? We find that only the high-
ability agents choose to keep up and they enjoy higher consumption but lower leisure than
those who stay out of the rat race. When ability-inequality rises in a mean-preserving
manner, average leisure and income in the economy may fall and leisure and income may
get more dispersed. Such connections between inequality, work, and consumption do not
emerge from a standard keeping-up-with-the-Joneses framework.
Embedded in a growth model, our framework has the potential to address themes
connecting current second moments with future first moments of the income distribution.
These themes recur in the works of Benabou (1996) and Galor (1996) among numerous
others. It is important to note that the source of inequality in these models is typically
a non-convex investment technology, preventing convergence of incomes. Our formulation
suggests that non-convexity in preferences may also be important.
The analysis also sheds some light on the transatlantic leisure-diﬀerential issue.24 Prescott
(2004), for example, has argued that higher marginal income tax rates in Europe relative
to the U.S. are closely correlated with their shorter workweeks and expanding vacations.
While no doubt tax rates have strong eﬀects on the first moment of the leisure distribution,
24Prescott (2004) and others ask: in recent times, why are Americans working so much harder than the
Europeans? Suppose one loosely proxies the income distribution by the innate-ability distribution. In that
case, one could argue that all else being similar across the two shores of the Atlantic, the higher income
inequality in the United States may be inducing more Americans to join the rat race and work harder on
average than their European counterparts.
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our analysis suggests that fundamental inequality may have additional eﬀects on average
leisure above and beyond those implied by average tax rates. Our analysis also suggests
that the entire distribution of tax rates (aka the tax structure), not just the average tax
rate, that aﬀects the various moments of the leisure distribution.
Our preference formulation has other potential applications, such as in the area of asset
pricing. Similarly, the model could be extended to allow diﬀerent income classes to keep
up with consumption levels closer to their own. A dynamic version of this economy that
includes a consumption-saving choice may shed light on the connection between income
inequality and aggregate savings. Our formulation may also prove to be important in
interpreting the recent evidence on leisure inequality in the U.S. (see Kuhn and Lozano,
2008). We leave these, and other issues, for future research.
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Appendix
A Additive log preferences
We briefly sketch the model in the case where preferences take the log-log form (used in
Section 4) above:
U (c, l) ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
ln (c+ θ (c− κ)) + φ ln l if c > κ
ln c+ φ ln l if c ≤ κ
.
In this case, it is easy to verify that (3)-(4) is replaced by
lid =
φ
¡
1 + hi
¢
1 + φ
; lir = l
i
d −
φθκ
w (φ+ 1) (θ + 1)
(19)
cid = w
¡
1 + hi
¢
1 + φ
; cir = c
i
d +
φθκ
(φ+ 1) (θ + 1)
. (20)
Notice that both cir and lir now depend on κ.Also, the gap between lir and lid (parenthetically,
the gap between cir and cid) depends on κ : as κ rises, these gaps rise. Also note that it
is no longer the case that lir < l
j
d for any i, j but c
i
r > c
j
d obviously continues to hold. An
agent will choose to stay out of the rat race if the utility from participating exceeds that
of staying out. Formally, those hi for whom the following inequality hold will participate:
ln
¡
cir + θ
¡
cir − κ
¢¢
+ φ ln lir > ln c
i
d + φ ln l
i
d.
Straightforward algebra shows that when κ = λc¯, the previous inequality reduces to
hi > hˆ ≡ θ
(θ + 1)− (θ + 1)
φ
1+φ
³ c¯
λw
´
− 1, (21)
where (θ + 1) − (θ + 1)
φ
1+φ > 0 and θ/[(θ + 1) − (θ + 1)
φ
1+φ ] > 1.25 Using the expressions
for cid and c
i
r derived earlier, it is straightforward to check that
c¯ =
w (θ + 1)
¡
h¯+ 1
¢
1 + φ+ θ + θλφF
³
hˆ;σ
´ . (22)
25Note that
lir > 0⇔ 1 + hi −
θλc¯
w (θ + 1)
> 0.
It is straightforward to verify that the previous inequality holds for all hi ≥ hˆ. This means every rat race
participant enjoys a strictly interior level of leisure.
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Using (21) and (22), we derive the analog of eq. (9):
w (θ + 1)
¡
h¯+ 1
¢
1 + φ+ θ + θλφF
³
hˆ;σ
´ = w
⎛
⎝(θ + 1)− (θ + 1)
φ
1+φ
θλ
⎞
⎠
³
1 + hˆ
´
.
In the model with lotteries, the expressions for the lottery contract and leisure are described
in Section 4. The remaining expressions, the ones for consumption, and the first and second
moments of the leisure and income distributions, are collected below.
drop-outs cid = w
(1+hi)
1+φ
¡
1 + hi
¢
<
¡
1 + h†
¢
lottery players cilot = αich + (1− αi) cl
¡
1 + h†
¢
<
¡
1 + hi
¢
< (1 + h∗)
participants cir = cid +
φθκ
(φ+1)(θ+1)
¡
1 + hi
¢
> (1 + h∗)
where αi = yi−clch−cl and ch and cl are calculated from (18). Notice, consumption of lottery
players, unlike their leisure, depends on their h; also note that cilot is the ex-ante expected
income of a lottery player with ability hi.
Next, we define the first and second moments of the leisure and ex-ante income dis-
tributions. These are analogs of the expressions derived in Section 2.3. First, average
leisure:
l¯ =
Z h†
hl
lid dF
¡
hi
¢
+
Z h∗
h†
llot dF
¡
hi
¢
+
Z hu
h∗
lir dF
¡
hi
¢
. (23)
Similarly, the variance of leisure may be calculated from
V (l) =
Z h†
hl
¡
lid − l¯
¢2 dF ¡hi¢+ Z h∗
h†
¡
llot − l¯
¢2 dF ¡hi¢+ Z hu
h∗
¡
lir − l¯
¢2 dF ¡hi¢ . (24)
Finally, average ex-ante income:
y¯ =
Z h†
hl
cid dF
¡
hi
¢
+
Z h∗
h†
cilot dF
¡
hi
¢
+
Z hu
h∗
cir dF
¡
hi
¢
, (25)
and variance of ex-ante income:
V (y) =
Z h†
hl
¡
cid − y¯
¢2 dF ¡hi¢+Z h∗
h†
¡
cilot − y¯
¢2 dF ¡hi¢+Z hu
h∗
¡
cir − y¯
¢2 dF ¡hi¢ . (26)
B Proof of Proposition 5
We start by writing down the indirect expected utility to agent i from participation in the
lottery:
Ui = α (l∗i (cl, ch) , cl, ch) (u ((1 + θ) ch − θκ))+(1− α (l∗i (cl, ch) , cl, ch))u (cl)+φv (l∗i (cl, ch))
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where l∗i (cl, ch) is the optimal leisure of agent i. Then, assuming interior solutions,
∂Ui
∂cl
=
µ
α1
∂l∗i (cl, ch)
∂cl
+ α2
¶
(u ((1 + θ) ch − θκ))−
µ
α1
∂l∗i (cl, ch)
∂cl
+ α2
¶
u (cl)
+ (1− α (l∗i (cl, ch) , cl, ch))u0 (cl) + φv0 (l∗i (cl, ch))
∂l∗i (cl, ch)
∂cl
= 0,
and
∂Ui
∂ch
=
µ
α1
∂l∗i (cl, ch)
∂ch
+ α3
¶
(u ((1 + θ) ch − θκ)) + α (l∗i (cl, ch) , cl, ch) (1 + θ)u0 ((1 + θ) ch − θκ)
−
µ
α1
∂l∗i (cl, ch)
∂ch
+ α3
¶
u (cl) + φv0 (l∗i (cl, ch))
∂l∗i (cl, ch)
∂ch
= 0,
where αj is the partial derivative of α with respect to its jth argument. The above first
order conditions may be rewritten as
∂Ui
∂cl
=
£
α1 (u ((1 + θ) ch − θκ)− u (cl)) + φv0 (l∗i (cl, ch))
¤ ∂l∗ (cl, ch)
∂cl
−α2u (cl) + (1− α (l∗i (cl, ch) , cl, ch))u0 (cl) + α2 (u ((1 + θ) ch − θκ)) = 0,
and
∂Ui
∂ch
=
£
α1 (u ((1 + θ) ch − θκ)− u (cl)) + φv0 (l∗i (cl, ch))
¤ ∂l∗i (cl, ch)
∂ch
+α3 (u ((1 + θ) ch − θκ)− u (cl)) + α (l∗i (cl, ch) , cl, ch) (1 + θ)u0 ((1 + θ) ch − θκ) = 0.
Using the envelope theorem, we get
∂Ui
∂cl
= (1− α (l∗i (cl, ch) , cl, ch))u0 (cl) + α2 (·) (u ((1 + θ) ch − θκ)− u (cl)) = 0
∂Ui
∂ch
= α3 (·) (u ((1 + θ) ch − θκ)− u (cl)) + α (l∗i (cl, ch) , cl, ch) (1 + θ)u0 ((1 + θ) ch − θκ) = 0.
Using αi =
y(li)−cl
ch−cl , α2 = −
ch−y(li)
(ch−cl)2
, α3 = − y(li)−cl(ch−cl)2 , we get
∂Ui
∂cl
= 0⇔ (ch − cl)u0 (cl) = (u ((1 + θ) ch − θκ)− u (cl)) , (27)
∂Ui
∂ch
= 0⇔ (ch − cl) (1 + θ)u0 ((1 + θ) ch − θκ) = (u ((1 + θ) ch − θκ)− u (cl)) .(28)
Since the r.h.s of (27) and (28) are the same, it follows that u
0(cl)
(1+θ)u0((1+θ)ch−θκ) = 1 implying
u0 (cl) = (1 + θ)u0 ((1 + θ) ch − θκ) .
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C Proof of Lemma 1
Since
1 + hˆ =
κ
w
+
φ ln (1 + θ)
θw
=
κ
w
+
φ
w
ln (1 + θ)
θ
and drop-outs are those with hi < hˆ, we have
1 + hi < 1 + hˆ =
κ
w
+
φ
w
ln (1 + θ)
θ
<
κ+ φ
w
.
Since
cid = w
µ
1 + hi − φ
w
¶
< κ⇐⇒ 1 + hi < κ+ φ
w
we get
hi < hˆ⇒ cid < κ
Similarly,
cir = w
µ
1 + hi − φ
w (1 + θ)
¶
> κ⇐⇒ 1 + hi > κ
w
+
φ
w (1 + θ)
and since, rat race participants are those with hi > hˆ, we have
1+hi > 1+ hˆ =
κ
w
+
φ
w
ln (1 + θ)
θ
=
κ
w
+
φ
w (1 + θ)
(1 + θ) ln (1 + θ)
θ
>
κ
w
+
φ
w (1 + θ)
because (1+θ) ln(1+θ)θ > 1.
Finally, it is straightford to show that the solutions for the unconstrained problems for
the agent with hi = hˆ, conform to the constraints cid ≤ κ and cir > κ. By definition of hˆ,
b
³
hˆ;κ
´
=
θφ
1 + θ
+ θ
µ
w
µ
1 + hˆ− φ
w (1 + θ)
¶
− κ
¶
− φ ln (1 + θ) = 0.
The term w
³
1 + hˆ− φw(1+θ)
´
is the solution for consumption cir. Solving, we have:
cir = κ+ φ
µ
ln (1 + θ)
θ
− 1
1 + θ
¶
Since ln(1+θ)θ >
1
1+θ for θ > 0, c
i
r > κ. On the other hand,
cid = c
i
r +
θφ
(1 + θ)
− φ = κ+ φ
µ
ln (1 + θ)
θ
− 1
¶
.
Since ln(1+θ)θ < 1 for θ > 0, c
i
d < κ.
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D Proof of Lemma 2
First note that λ < 1 < λ such that the relevant interval for λ is non-empty. Let the left
hand side of (9) be denoted by
l (h) ≡
¡
h− h¯
¢
+
1
w
µ
φλθ
1 + θ
¶
F (h;σ) (29)
and the right hand side by
g ≡ 1
w
µ
φ ln (1 + θ)
θ
− λφ
(1 + θ)
¶
+ (λ− 1)
¡
1 + h¯
¢
. (30)
Further, it follows from (29) that l0 (h) > 0, implying there is a unique equilibrium if
l (hl) < g and l (hu) > g. First consider l (hl) < g. Since F (hl) = 0,
l (hl) < g ⇔ hl + 1−
φ
w
ln (1 + θ)
θ
<
µ
1 + h¯− φ
w
1
(1 + θ)
¶
λ (31)
By (A.1), φ < φu ≡ w (1 + hl) . Then, it follows that
hl + 1−
φ
w
ln (1 + θ)
θ
≥ hl + 1−
φu
w
ln (1 + θ)
θ
= (hl + 1)
µ
1− ln (1 + θ)
θ
¶
> 0
and
1 + h¯− φ
w
1
(1 + θ)
≥ 1 + h¯− φu
w
1
1 + θ
= (1 + hl)
µ
1 + h¯
1 + hl
− 1
1 + θ
¶
> 0
implying both sides of the above inequality in (31) are positive. Hence, it follows that
l (hl) < g ⇔ λ ≤ λ.
Now consider l (hu) > g. Since F (hu) = 1,
g < l (hu)⇔ λ
µ
1 + h¯− φ
w
¶
< 1 + hu −
φ
w
ln (1 + θ)
θ
⇔ λ < λ.
¥
E Proof of Lemma 3
Under (A.2), the condition provided in Lemma 2, there exists a unique hˆ. Since l (h) is
increasing and initially smaller than g, we know that hˆ > h¯ is equivalent to the knowledge
that the crossing of l and g has not yet occurred at h¯. If this is the case, l
¡
h¯
¢
must be
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smaller than g. The argument for hˆ < h¯ is exactly equivalent. Therefore, it follows that
hˆ T h¯ iﬀ l
¡
h¯
¢
T g. Noting that for a symmetric distribution, F ¡h¯¢ = 1/2, we get:
l
¡
h¯
¢
< g ⇔ 1
w
µ
φλθ
1 + θ
¶
F ¡h¯¢ < 1
w
µ
φ ln (1 + θ)
θ
− λφ
(1 + θ)
¶
+ (λ− 1)
¡
1 + h¯
¢
Further simplification yields
1 + h¯− 1
w
φ ln (1 + θ)
θ
< λ
µ
1 + h¯− φ
2w
2 + θ
1 + θ
¶
⇔ λ† ≡
1 + h¯− φw
ln(1+θ)
θ
1 + h¯− φw
1
(1+θ)
¡
1 + θ2
¢ < λ.
The remaining part of the lemma is trivial to verify.¥
F Proof of Proposition 1
Diﬀerentiating (9) yields
∂hˆ
∂σ
+
1
w
µ
λφθ
1 + θ
¶Ã
f
³
hˆ, σ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
+ F2
³
hˆ, σ
´!
= 0
which upon rearrangement produces
∂hˆ
∂σ
= −
1
w
³
λφθ
1+θ
´
F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
1 + 1w
³
λφθ
1+θ
´
f
³
hˆ, σ
´ . (32)
Hence, the sign of ∂hˆ∂σ is the opposite of the sign of F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
. For symmetric distributions,
when λ > λ†, hˆ lies to the right of the single crossing point
¡
h¯
¢
and so F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
< 0; hence
∂hˆ
∂σ < 0.¥
G Proof of Proposition 2
Straightforward diﬀerentiation of (11) yields
∂l¯
∂σ
=
φθ
(1 + θ)w
Ã
f
³
hˆ, σ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
+ F2
³
hˆ, σ
´!
Substituting the expression for ∂hˆ∂σ from (32) and rearranging, we get
∂l¯
∂σ
=
φθ
(1 + θ)w
⎛
⎝
F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
1 + 1w
³
λφθ
1+θ
´
f
³
hˆ, σ
´
⎞
⎠
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which has the same sign as F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
.
H Proof of Proposition 3
Straightforward diﬀerentiation of V (l) yields
∂V (l)
∂σ
=
µ
φ
w
¶2µ θ
(1 + θ)
¶2ÃÃ
F2
³
hˆ
´
+ F
³
hˆ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
!
− 2F
³
hˆ
´Ã
F2
³
hˆ
´
+ F
³
hˆ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
!!
=
µ
φ
w
¶2µ θ
(1 + θ)
¶2 ³
1− 2F
³
hˆ
´´Ã
F2
³
hˆ
´
+F
³
hˆ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
!
Recall that the sign of ∂hˆ∂σ is the opposite of the sign of F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
. For symmetric, unimodal
distributions, when λ > λ†, hˆ lies to the right of the single crossing point
¡
h¯
¢
and so
F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
< 0; hence ∂hˆ∂σ < 0. In that case 1− 2F
³
hˆ
´
< 0 as well, and ∂V (l)∂σ > 0.
I Proof of Proposition 4
Straightforward diﬀerentiation of y¯ yields
∂y¯
∂σ
= −φf
³
hˆ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
− φF2
³
hˆ
´
+
φ
(1 + θ)
f
³
hˆ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
+
φ
(1 + θ)
F2
³
hˆ
´
= − θφ
(1 + θ)
"
f
³
hˆ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
+ F2
³
hˆ
´#
using the expression for ∂hˆ∂σ derived earlier, this reduces to
∂y¯
∂σ
= − θφ
(1 + θ)
F2
³
hˆ, σ
´ 1
1 + 1w
³
λφθ
1+θ
´
f
³
hˆ, σ
´
implying ∂y¯∂σ has the opposite sign of F2. The rest is as before.
Straightforward diﬀerentiation of V (y) yields
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∂V (y)
∂σ
= 2σw2 + φ2
µ
θ
(1 + θ)
¶2
×Ã
f
³
hˆ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
³
1− F
³
hˆ
´´
− F
³
hˆ
´
f
³
hˆ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
+ F2
³
hˆ, σ
´³
1− F
³
hˆ
´´
− F
³
hˆ
´
F2
³
hˆ, σ
´!
= 2σw2 + φ2
µ
θ
(1 + θ)
¶2 "³
1− 2F
³
hˆ
´´
f
³
hˆ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
+
³
1− 2F
³
hˆ
´´
F2
³
hˆ, σ
´#
= 2σw2 + φ2
µ
θ
(1 + θ)
¶2 ³
1− 2F
³
hˆ
´´"
f
³
hˆ
´ ∂hˆ
∂σ
+ F2
³
hˆ, σ
´#
= 2σw2 + φ2
µ
θ
(1 + θ)
¶2 ³
1− 2F
³
hˆ
´´
F2
³
hˆ, σ
´ 1
1 + 1w
³
λφθ
1+θ
´
f
³
hˆ, σ
´
For symmetric, unimodal distributions, when λ > λ†, hˆ lies to the right of the single
crossing point
¡
h¯
¢
and so F2
³
hˆ, σ
´
< 0 and
³
1− 2F
³
hˆ
´´
< 0; hence ∂V (y)∂σ > 0.
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